The Law and Poor People’s Access to Health Care by Cantor, Norman L.
THE LAW AND POOR PEOPLE'S ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE
NORMAN L. CANTOR*
Studies of the health care delivery system and patterns of utilization ineluctably
point to the same basic conclusions-that "the poor are sicker than the nonpoor, and
yet they use fewer health services."1 The statistics on sickness and need for services
among poverty populations are staggering. Comparing families with annual incomes
of less than $2,ooo to those with incomes of $7,ooo or more, the former suffer from
heart conditions at a rate four times as high as the latter, they incur rheumatism and
arthritis six times as often, and they suffer eight times as many visual impairments.2
And while such figures on chronic illness are partially attributable to the large num-
bers of elderly poor, extraordinary amounts of illness plague all segments of the
poverty population. The data on usage of health services is no less conclusive in
supporting the proposition that poor persons receive health care far less frequently
than more affluent persons. For example, one study has indicated that children in
families with incomes under $2,ooo average 1.6 physician visits per year compared
with 5.7 visits for children in families with incomes over $7,oo. 4 Thus, illness is not
adequately treated and preventive services are seldom provided among the poor.
Although the facts on usage of services may be clear, the explanation is more
difficult to pinpoint, for a multitude of factors probably account for the ultimate fact
that poor persons do not receive sufficient services. There may be inadequate in-
formation or knowledge about the need for and availability of services, cultural
attitudes influencing utilization, problems of alienation, language barriers, or simply
physical distance barring usage of facilities. All of these elements may contribute to
some degree, or in some instances.6 But the thesis of this article is that the existence
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of a dual system of health care stemming from the economic condition of poor persons
-their low incomes-is the primary causal factor in their failure to obtain health
care.
The inescapable fact is that low income creates an inability to obtain decent
health services. Part of the reason is the geographical handicap of the ghetto, the
lack of physical access to physicians and hospitals. While the trend to specialization
among doctors and the concomitant loss of general practitioners have affected all
health consumers,' the poor have clearly been most affected. They simply cannot
afford the services of specialists,7 and the remaining general practitioners tend not
to practice among indigents. In one poverty area of the South Bronx, there were,
in 1967, four private physicians (two of them semi-retired) for a population of 45,oo0.
Similarly, the physical resources such as hospitals are sometimes accessible only by
lengthy rides on public transportation s The resources readily available, if any, are
the teeming outpatient departments and emergency rooms of municipal or county
hospitals. Where private, voluntary hospital facilities are geographically available,
the economic barrier to utilization may prove insurmountable. Particularly in the
case of teaching hospitals,9 indigent patients are often denied admission unless they
are "medically interesting" cases; 1 in some instances where hospitalization is war-
ranted, the private facility may refer, or "dump," the patient to a governmentally run
institution." Medicaid's promise to make quality care available to the poor has
gone largely unfulfilled. The unrealistic eligibility levels, the failure to enroll all
those eligible, the inadequate scope of services in some states, and the dearth of
cooperating providers have all combined to impede the improvement of access to
health care by the poor.
This paper's aim is to analyze potential legal channels for improving this somber
situation by increasing the access of poverty populations to health care. It might
be more expeditious to eliminate the underlying economic handicap-for example,
to provide universal and comprehensive health insurance through governmental
channels.' Indeed, it may eventually develop that litigation is unsuitable for effec-
tively attacking the massive economic and physical misallocations which contribute
6 See A. Somers, Some Basic Determinants of Medical Care and Health Policy, MmLANK MEmoMu AI
FUN Q., Jan. 1968, at 13.
7See Muller, supra note i, at 263.
8 A map of New York City health resources is enlightening on this point. See BULL. HEALTH POLICY
ADVISORY COUNCIL, Nov. x968, at 8.
0 Those institutions which train medical students, interns, or residents are here classified as teaching
hospitals. See generally M. CRucirroN, FivE PATIENTS (1970), describing the teaching function of
Massachusetts General Hospital.
" See R. Du= & A. HOLLNGSHEAD, SI KNESS AND SOCIETY 176-78 (x968).
'See Fisher v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 6862z (Super. Ct., filed Jan. X2, 1970).
"See, e.g., Fein, The Case for National Health Insurance, SATURDAY REVIEw, Aug. 22, 1970, at 27.
Of course, a new financing mechanism would not be a panacea without an accompanying effort to
reorganize the delivery system to make comprehensive services readily available to ghetto areas.
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to the access problemj' Yet the goal-ready access to decent health care-is so




As mentioned above, some medical facilities, most notably voluntary hospitals,
may deny access to medically uninteresting indigent patients. A fiscal officer as well
as a physician may screen the applicant for admission; failure to demonstrate ability
to meet the likely hospitalization costs, or to provide a substantial deposit, may be
grounds for rejection. 4 Poverty lawyers have argued strenuously that such economic
discrimination practiced by publicly funded institutions' 5 constitutes an invidious
discrimination within the meaning of the fourteenth amendments equal protection
clause.' 6 Under this thesis, medical care cannot be denied on the basis of inability
to pay. For example, in one case indigent patients argued that they could not be
denied usage of a renal dialysis machine in a public hospital merely because they
could not afford the extraordinary costs of the machine.' They contended both
that such a denial constituted a deprivation of life without due process of law and
that the economic discrimination was invidious under the equal protection clause.
The argument that government is under a constitutional obligation to mitigate the
disadvantages of indigent citizens is an extraordinary one in a society grounded on
a free market theory and exhibiting the effects of unequal distribution of wealth.
Yet the argument is not without support in modern constitutional doctrine. In at
least two contexts-administration of criminal justice and voting-the Supreme Court
has declared economic discrimination to be unconstitutional.' In Griffin v. Illinois,
the Court commented that "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
"
8 See pp. 903-909 infra.
"a DuFF & HOLLINGSHiAs, supra note io.
"
5 Ever since the Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3 (i883), a showing of "state action" has been a
prerequisite to judicial intervention under the fourteenth amendment. Voluntary hospitals have some-
times been found exempt from constitutional requirements on the basis that they are "private." See, e.g.,
Shulman v. Washintgon Hospital Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963). However, the combination
of governmental contacts from building loans, tax exemptions, research grants, and vendor payments
should suffice to establish "state action" in private hospitals, and the recent judicial trend is in that
direction. See Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4 th Cir. x964); Note, State Action, State Law, and the
Private Hospital, 62 MicH. L. REv. 1433 (1964); 57 Ky. L.J. 297 (i969). See generally Silard, A Con-
stitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 Cot um.
L. Rav. 855 (1966). For purposes of this article I am assuming that many private hospitals, as well
as all public institutions, are subject to fourteenth amendment restrictions.
"o See, e.g., Rose, The Duty of Publicly-Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent,
3 CLEARINGHOusE RaV. 254 (1970).
7 Butler v. Jones, Civ. No. 69-2799 (ED. Pa. 1969). No decision was ever obtained, as hospital
officials eventually lowered the barriers for the indigent plaintiffs.
"'See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367
(z969); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."'" And in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, Justice Douglas added that "[l]ines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race .. . , are traditionally disfavored."'
In both instances government was required to mitigate the effects of monetary
fees conditioning access to governmental "services," either by supplying the desired
"service" gratis to the indigent or by eliminating the economic barrier entirely. This
thrust against economic discrimination and the handicaps of poverty was given
further impetus by the 1969 decision in Shapiro v. Thompson21 There, in considering
a challenge to a state residency requirement restricting eligibility for welfare benefits,
the Court indicated that only a compelling state interest would justify a discrimination
affecting receipt of subsistence benefits and impinging on the right to travel freely
among the states Thus, it appeared that, at least, the traditional "mere rationality"
standard of equal protection would be replaced by a strict scrutiny test in cases
affecting the ability of impoverished citizens to obtain the necessities of life.
However, the thesis that economic discrimination is basically invidious and that
the poor cannot be denied access to governmentally-financed benefits (such as health
care) has been dealt a body blow by the Court's recent equal protection decision
in DandHdge v. Williams. There, welfare recipients attacked the constitutionality
of state "maximum grant" regulations. Under these provisions, states placed lim-
itations on dollar amounts which would be distributed to large families, regard-
less of increased needs of such families. Thus, in Maryland for example, the max-
imum grant was $250 per month, and families with ten or twelve children could
receive no more than families with six children. Plaintiffs had successfully challenged
the regulation before a three-judge district court panel on the basis that discrim-
ination according to family size rather than need constituted an invidious classifica-
tion in violation of equal protection guarantees.24 The Supreme Court reversed,
finding a rational relationship between the maximum grant regulation and two legit-
imate legislative purposes-encouragement of employment and avoidance of adverse
income discrepancies between welfare families and families of the working poor.25
That the regulation encouraged only welfare recipients with large families to seek em-
ployment, even though these recipients may be the least likely to be able to undertake
19 351 U.S. at 17.
20 383 U.S. at 668 (citations omitted).
21 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22 See also Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
28397 U.S. 471 (1970). But cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
2' See Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1969). Plaintiffs also contended that the
maximum grant regulations conflicted with provisions of the Social Security Act regarding satisfying
"needs" and preserving families, an argument which was rejected by the Supreme Court. 397 U.S. at
476-83.
It should be noted that virtually every 3-judge court which had ruled on maximum grant regulations
found them invalid, either on equal protection grounds or because of conflicts with the federal statute.
See cases cited in Note, The Maximum Grant Limitation on the Right to Survive, 3 GA. L. REv. 459
(x969).
22 397 U.S. at 486.
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work, and that the regulation did not demonstrably tie welfare incomes to incomes
of the working poor,28 did not affect the Court's finding of a rational basis for the
regulation.
Yet the shocking aspect of Dandridge is not so much the result as the calculated
manner in which the majority opinion undermined the foundation of the economic
discrimination theory. In the first place, the Court abjured the "strict scrutiny" or
"compelling interest" standard27 in favor of the more traditional "reasonable basis"
test.28 While recognizing that distribution of welfare benefits "involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," the Court insisted on treating
the Dandridge problem as a customary "economic regulation" case.P Shapiro v.
Thompson was relegated to a footnote,30 and no mention was made of the economic
discrimination cases. More importantly, the majority opinion stressed the fiscal
difficulties of the state, its limited resources, and the concomitant legislative need
to set careful limits on benefit levels.' This solicitude for state economic interests
appears, as will be explained more fully, incompatible with an expansive theory of
equal protection which attacks economic discrimination.
This is not to say that the theory of invidious economic discrimination is dead.
After all, Dandridge in one sense is not an economic discrimination case. The
" Id. at 524-27. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"
7 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (x969).
"
8 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HItv. L. REv. io65 (1969).
20 397 U.S. at 485. Compare the following statement in Rothstein v. Wyman, 3o3 F. Supp. 339,
346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (footnotes omitted), where a 3-judge court applied a "compelling interest" stan-
dard in reviewing an equal protection challenge to a welfare regulation:
"Receipt of welfare benefits may not at the present time constitute the exercise of a constitu-
tional right. But among our Constitution's expressed purposes was the desire to 'insure domestic
tranquility' and 'promote the general Welfare.' Implicit in those phrases are certain basic concepts
of humanity and decency. One of these, voiced as a goal in recent years by most responsible
governmental leaders, both federal and state, is the desire to insure that indigent, unemployable
citizens will at least have the bare minimums required for existence, without which our expressed
fundamental constitutional rights and liberties frequently cannot be exercised and therefore
become meaningless. Legislation with respect to welfare assistance, therefore, like that dealing with
public education, access to public parks or playgrounds, or use of the mails, deals with a critical
aspect of the personal lives of our citizens, whether such assistance be labelled a 'right,'
'privilege' or 'benefit.' . . . Its importance is magnified by the defenseless and disadvantaged
state of the class of citizens to which it relates, who are usually less able than others to
enforce their rights. It can hardly be doubted that the subsistence level of our indigent and un-
employable aged, blind and disabled involves a more crucial aspect of life and liberty than the
right to operate a business on Sunday or to extract gas from subsoil. We believed that with the
stakes so high in terms of human misery the equal protection standard to be applied should be
stricter than that used upon review of commercial legislation and more nearly approximate that
applied to laws affecting fundamental constitutional rights. Poverty is a bitter enough brew. It
should not be made even less palatable by the addition of unjustifiable inequalities or discrimina-
tions. It must not be forgotten that in most cases public assistance represents the last resource of
those bereft of any alternative. Equity (the state or quality of being equal, derived from the
latin aequitas), should least of all be denied the poor."
$0397 U.S. at 484 n.16. Justice Stewart's opinion merely notes that Shapiro, where a compelling
interest formula was applied to a welfare regulation, involved interference with the constitutional right
of interstate travel, which (unlike welfare payments) he considered guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.$1397 U.S. at 487.
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allegedly invidious classification there related to family size; the welfare recipients,
whether in large families or small, were similarly situated as far as initial economic
status was concerned. While the invidious discrimination lay in the allocation of
monetary benefits, the scheme of distribution did not depend on wealth and did not
vary according to the economic status of the recipients.
Yet in another sense Dandridge is in fact an economic discrimination case. The
distribution of benefits did not vary according to family need; the result was to
create classes of people with unequal economic status despite similar personal needs.
If there is a governmental obligation to assure affirmatively that certain financially
deprived citizens do not suffer greater adverse consequences from their economic
straits than other persons with similar needs, the distribution scheme in Dandridge
accomplished the antithesis of what is required. The maximum grant regulation
literally created discrepancies in wealth despite citizens' similar needs.
Further, the Court's concern for state fiscal resources reveals a prime obstacle
to widespread judicial invocation of the economic discrimination theory-the fear
of massive judicial intervention in the allocation of government resources. The
redress of economic imbalances in any area of contemporary life inevitably involves
tremendous expenditures. Take health care as an example. If the invidious discrim-
ination consists of governmental allocation of services so that poor persons are
deprived of health care, alleviation of this condition requires enormous sums for
acquisition of facilities, equipment, and staff. Even if the discrimination consists
only of unequal systems for rich and poor, elimination of the discrepancies requires
huge outlays. The decision to allocate governmental revenues is traditionally a
legislative function; indeed, it is an integral aspect of the separation of powers.
The judicial hesitancy to establish an equal protection doctrine which impels massive
governmental expenditures is therefore understandable, even if in opposition to
desirable social goals.
Underlying this hesitancy is the realization that the economic discrimination theory
is potentially applicable to a host of de facto economic bars extant in a free enter-
prise society. A cursory look at governmental services alone indicates that economic
status closely affects access to licenses, toll roads, amusement areas, universities, public
tranportation, and public utility services, among other things. Eliminating economic
bars or disadvantages in any or all of these areas would be enormously expensive.
Along with this basic fact, the dismal economic conditions of urban governments,
and even some state governments, must be considered. Again, the judicial hesitancy
to direct large expenditures is not difficult to fathom.
Another obstacle to judicial expansion of the economic discrimination theory is
inability to enforce the doctrine once established. How does a court compel compliance
with a mandate that a local government provide a school in an economically de-
prived neighborhood?32 Is the judiciary willing to confront executive and legislative
3' Cf. U.S. CONsr. amend. XI.
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intransigence toward decrees ordering elected representatives to expend vast sums
on judicially designated objects?" In the cases involving economic discrimination
in the administration of criminal justice, there was a built-in sanction-the release
of indigent prisoners if government failed to provide the requisite items (counsel,
transcripts, and so forth). No such ready enforcement mechanism is available if a
court orders construction of a school or hospital in an impoverished neighborhood.
It might be argued that health care is so intimately related to existence itself that
the subject deserves special consideration. In other words, economic barriers might
be constitutionally impermissible in the case of health services but not in other fields
(education, transportation, and the like) less integrally tied up with life and health.
This seems a rather spurious argument. How can health care be realistically dis-
tinguished from transportation, which affects ability to earn a living, or plain absence
of adequate welfare benefits, which affects ability to subsist? Indeed, in states where
no separate medical benefits program exists, people may depend on general welfare
benefits for medical care as well as food and shelter, and a decision to constitutionally
compel payments for indigents' medical care would automatically increase basic
welfare payments in those states.
From the above observations, it appears that the theory that economic status pre-
cluding access to health care imposes affirmative governmental obligations to remedy
the de facto discrimination is not likely to provide the health facilities or increased
access needed to end the dual system of health care. The law in this area will not
be static. Equal treatment in the administration of criminal justice is an established
principle, and extension of the principle to the entire court system, civil as well as
criminal, is likely to ensue3 4 But extension of the theory to transportation, education,
health care, and the like is not on the immediate horizon. Solutions to the health
care crisis must be sought elsewhere.
B. The Right to Life
An alternative constitutional argument for requiring government to furnish
health care has been advanced which avoids some of the pitfalls of the equal-
protection/economic-discrimination theory. First articulated by Professor Edward
Sparer 5 and carefully elaborated by Professor Frank Michelman,30 the "right-to-
life" notion posits an affirmative governmental obligation to furnish citizens with the
minimum "necessities" of life-shelter, income sufficient to procure food and clothes,
and health care. The constitutional foundation is found primarily in the economic
discrimination cases cited above 37 However, the constitutional handle is not so much
" Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
- See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1322 (1966); Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YA.E L.J. 545 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (971).
" Shenker, Guarantee of 'Right to Live' is Urged, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, i969, at 40, col. 4.
"Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, in The
Supreme Court, z968 Term, 83 HAw. L. REV. 7 (1969).
'See notes x8-2o supra and accompanying text.
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discrimination against persons without wealth as it is "deprivation" of basic neces-
sities. "[T]he only inequality turns out to be that some persons... are suffering
from inability to satisfy certain 'basic' wants which presumably are felt by all alike.""8
Occasionally the same "right-to-life" argument is framed in due process rather than
equal protection terms. 9 Under the latter formulation it becomes a deprivation of
life or liberty without due process if a state permits its indigents to die from starva-
tion, exposure to the elements, or absence of medical assistance. But whether the
argument is framed in equal protection or due process language, its thrust is that
citizens must be provided with the necessities for subsistence, as the exercise of
fundamental civil liberties depends initially on the ability to survive.
As noted, the right-to-life approach does avert some weaknesses of the economic
discrimination theory in combating the handicaps of poverty.40 The right-to-life
formulation avoids obsession with absolute equality of treatment, an element which
is simply not realistic in a free market economy. It is futile to hope, for example,
that government can provide counsel for the indigent equivalent in skill to the
high-priced talent available to the rich client; the obligation must instead be to
furnish competent counsel. Similarly, under the right-to-life approach there would
be no temptation to achieve equality by bringing everyone down to the lowest com-
mon denominator-even if that means no care; the obligation to avoid economic
discrimination in government-supported activities, such as higher education for
example, can be too easily fulfilled by abolishing all state universities.
At the same time, the right-to-life approach suffers from some of the same
infirmities as the economic discrimination argument. The result of invoking min-
imum protection rather than equal protection is still massive judicial reallocation of
governmental resources. The judiciary's natural reluctance to fix over-all priorities
persists.41 Similarly, doubt persists about the judiciary's ability to enforce a minimum
protection decree in the face of limited public resources. Even if fiscal resources are
available, the justiciability of the minimum-protection or right-to-life requirement
would be in grave doubt. That is, are courts equipped to determine what constitutes
minimum shelter, minimum education, minimum health care, or the level of income
needed for basic food and shelter? Can courts decide whether health care is to be
upgraded by the addition of physicians or equipment or physical plant? And if the
answer is physicians, will the courts rule on the qualifications of the personnel ob-
tained? The only objective factor which courts are equipped to measure is money.
Yet requiring the expenditure of funds at a given level by no means assures that the
end product will be a satisfactory level of health care.
The viability of the right-to-life, minimum-protection analysis is in considerable
8
sMiclielman, supra note 36, at 13 (italics omitted).
' Graham, A Poor Person's Right to Life, Liberty and Property, 17 WELiAEr L. BULL. 28 (1969).
"'See Mfichelman, supra note 36, at 11.
11 Cf. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLum. L. Rav. 62s, 689 (1969), where the authors discuss
the difficulties attached to setting priorities among "competing necessities" such as health care and housing.
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doubt as a result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rosado v. Wyman.2
Rosado was an action by New York welfare recipients challenging a state reduction
in the "standard of need" for determining welfare eligibility. By eliminating items
previously included in computing the state's standard of need, New York had
reduced benefits to recipients by almost $40 million. The claim was that New York's
reduction contravened a federal requirement that states re-evaluate their standards of
need to reflect cost of living increases. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Harlan, held that the state had in fact impermissibly lowered its standard of need
in violation of the federal requirement. However, the court simultaneously ruled that
the state could reduce the level of actual assistance paid, regardless of the standard
of need, in order to combat budgetary pressures. Further, there was no barrier to
state payments according to average needs of recipients even if the particularized
needs of some individuals would not be met 3 The state was not constitutionally
barred from pursuing administrative efficiency even if the net assistance to some
families would be reduced below already insufficient levels.
Rosado thus hamstrings the movement toward establishment of a constitutional
right to life which would encompass the provision of basic health care. Unless health
care is more integrally related to existence than food or shelter, it will be difficult
to evade the implications of the decision. When the moment arrives that the
Court undertakes through constitutional interpretation to end the most crippling
effects of poverty, the mechanism may well be minimum protection rather than
economic discrimination. But the immediate prospects are not bright for a con-





One of the most distressing hospital practices, common to urban areas, is the
"dumping" of indigent, medically "uninteresting" patients into already undermanned
governmental facilities.44 A private, voluntary facility will divert ambulances to
nearby municipal or county hospitals, either without rendering any treatment or
after giving perfunctory attention; eventually the ambulance drivers are conditioned
to delivering patients from poverty neighborhoods directly to the governmental
institutions. Similarly, many private voluntary hospitals may redirect indigent
ambulatory patients needing inpatient care to overcrowded governmental insti-
tutions; exceptions would likely be made only for medically interesting cases
'5397 U.S. 397 (1970).
Slrd. at 419.
"See Fisher v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 68621 (Super. Ct., filed Jan. 12, X970); Jones v.
City of New York, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954); New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss.
185, 146 So. 2d 882 (r962).
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and perhaps for some Medicaid patients. The consequences are occasionally extreme,
for patients have been known to die en route from private hospitals to municipal
facilities 5
To prevent these unnecessary deaths alone, it would be important to establish
unequivocally an obligation of all hospitals to treat all emergency cases. But the issue
assumes added importance when considered in light of modern patterns of hospital
usage. A significant phenomenon of contemporary medical care is the evolution of
the hospital emergency room into a full-fledged outpatient clinic. Such facilities have
become, in effect, twenty-four-hour dispensaries-the place of first resort for an entire
spectrum of problems from the coughing child to the critically injured accident
victim. Hospital administrators may object to this usurpation of the emergency
room's intended function,46 but the emerging patterns of usage and the public's
determination are dear. The number of emergency room visits has increased much
faster than either inpatient admissions or outpatient visits, and studies indicate that
the trend will continue at an increased rate.47 Moreover, studies confirm that
growth in volume has been accompanied by a trend away from genuine emergency
cases toward basic health care4 Nonemergency cases, involving minor illnesses
and injuries, have been responsible to a substantial degree for the transformation
of the emergency room into an ad hoc clinic. This is not surprising, considering
that to many patients any complaint may become an emergency if they cannot locate
a physician or, as is more often the case with applicants for emergency room care,
they cannot afford a private physician. Changing emergency room usage is also
related to the gradual development of the modern urban hospital into the focal
point of all health services 9 The hospital represents the institutionalization of health
care delivery, offering complex and costly equipment operated by skilled personnel.
Along with centralization of care, the public must deal with the pressing shortage of
physicians, the disappearance of the traditional family doctor, and the disinclination
of physicians to make house calls. Moreover, the schedules of medical offices and out-
patient departments do not usually coincide with the needs of the working poor.
The result of these processes has been the public's general acceptance of the idea
' This conclusion is based upon personal conversations with interns and medical students in New
York City, as well as on information broadcast on television documentaries prepared by NET and CBS
during 1970.
"6 See generally The Emergency Department Problem: An Overview, x98 J.A.M.A. 380 (1966).
" 'E.g., The Nation's Hospitals: A Statistical Profile, HosprrALs (GUnDE IssuE), Aug. x, x966, pt. 2,
at 427 et seq. Public Health Service projections for the decade 196o-70 indicated increased general ho5-
pital use of 8% compared to a 79% growth in emergency room visits. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, Hos-
piTAL OUTPATIENT SERvicEs: FACTs AND TRENDS 14-15 (Hospital and Medical Facilities Series No.
9 3o-C-6, 1966).
"For example, a i961 study of 300 hospitals indicated that 42% of all emergency visits were non-
emergent. Skudder, McCarroll & Wade, Hospital Emergency Facilities and Services, A Survey, 46 BULL.
Am. COLL. SURGEONS 44 (1961). See also Stichter, Medical Stafng of Emergency Rooms, 62 OHIO SaE
MED. J. 6oo (1966); The Emergency Department Problem: An Overview, supra note 46.
"o See, e.g., Knowles, The Teaching Hospital: Historical Perspective and a Contemporary View, in
HospiTALs, DocToRs AND THE PUBLIC INTER , 13-15 (J. Knowles ed. x965).
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that hospital facilities, especially emergency facilities, should be available for all kinds
of illnesses and injuries, at any time and without appointment.
In light of these developments, it becomes all the more important to guarantee
ready accesss of indigent patients to emergency room facilities. The first step in
this process is to remove the legal uncertainty surrounding the issue of a hospital's
obligation to treat and care for genuine emergency cases. Establishment of this
narrow principle would likely have marked repercussions on operation of emergency
room facilities generally. In the first place, the legal definition of "emergency" can
probably not be restricted to cases where death is imminent or even likely should
treatment not be provided. For the common notion of emergency includes the
preservation not just of life but of body and health, where these are seriously en-
dangered.5" Once a clear duty to treat emergencies is established, hospitals would be
risking liability every time treatment was denied. Certainly the practice would be to
have a physician make a careful examination before considering transfer; and if a
patient articulates severe complaints, there is a potential "emergency" which is not
likely to be ignored. Hopefully, physicians would be less inclined to dismiss the
"junk" case-the sore throat, severe headache, or abdominal pain patient-without
examination and treatment, and, once treatment is undertaken, it cannot be ter-
minated (without malpractice exposure) in a manner which would worsen the
condition of the patient. Finally, confirmation of a clear obligation to treat all
emergency cases should encourage more liberal attention to all presenting cases
and the reorganization of the emergency room into an outpatient facility capable
of both emergency and nonemergency care at all times.
The law in this area is gradually progressing toward the desired goal of required
treatment of all emergency cases. Traditionally, a hospital was under no duty to
maintain emergency services or to provide emergency care to the general public.
This was but one aspect of the underlying proposition that a hospital may reject any
patient that it does not choose to treat.51 However, the courts, in the context of
emergency care, have constantly striven to avoid the harsh consequences of allowing
hospitals such broad prerogatives; they have literally strained to impose liability for
the callous disregard of humanity implicit in the rejection of emergency cases.
The theory most commonly used to circumvent the basic "no-duty" rule is that of
"gratuitous undertaking."52 According to this theory, the hospital's exercise of
control over a patient imposes an obligation to act reasonably, including a duty not
to transfer or turn the patient away if such rejection would worsen the condition
of the patient or inflict further harm. Under this standard a hospital could never
discharge a patient, once some control is exercised, without furnishing or procuring
"°See New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 197, 146 So. 2d 882, 887 (1962); Williams
v. Hospital Authority, II9 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (1969).
"' Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 ('934); 62 COLUm. L. R v. 730
(1962); 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (1944).
'2 RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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sufficient care to alleviate the emergency condition 3 In one case a mere wait on a
stretcher in the emergency room was sufficient "control" to trigger the hospital's
obligation. 4 However, it is apparent that under the gratuitous undertaking theory
a hospital may avoid liability by rejecting an applicant outright without exercising
any form of control.
A more promising theory, then, is one which views the operation of emergency
facilities as a standing invitation to the public to utilize the emergency services,
justifying public reliance on the constant availability of emergency treatment. 5 The
seminal case in this area is Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove5 There, plain-
tiff's four-month-old child had been brought to the hospital suffering from diarrhea
and a severe fever; the hospital turned the parents and child away without even
examining the child. The baby died the same day from bronchial pneumonia. The
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a tort action against the hospital, not on the
theory that a hospital must normally care for emergency cases but rather on the
basis that the parents had relied to their detriment on the established custom of the
hospital to render emergency care. The hospital had held itself out as offering
emergency help, and reliance on that representation presumably resulted in detri-
mental foregoing of alternative help. The same theory recently applied in a
Missouri case to impose liability on a hospital which had rejected a frostbite victim
because of inability to pay a $25 deposit7
The theory that maintenance of emergency facilities constitutes an implied in-
vitation to the public probably suffices to impose liability in the vast majority of
desired circumstances. However, the notion that this theory depends on detrimental
"reliance" is a subterfuge and might readily be abandoned. Suppose a hospital were
the only medical facility in a given area, so that reliance could not be said to have
worsened the patient's chances of recovery since there was no alternative facility avail-
able. Liability would'still be appropriate, despite the absence of detrimental reliance,
simply because -the presentation of a seriously ill individual to an institution equipped
to alleviate human distress is sufficient to trigger a "humanitarian" obligation
which must be enforceable, if necessary, in a court of law.
Public and voluntary hospitals, organized as charitable institutions, operate for
the very purpose of healing the sick and injured. To permit such an institution to
deny its fundamental purpose when confronted with an emergency case is in-
tolerable. A similar sentiment was recently expressed by a Georgia court in upholding
a See New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962); Corten v. Harbor
Hospital, 279 App. Div. 673, io8 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1951).
"'Methodist Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (196i).
See Bernstein, Law in Brief, Hosz'iT.r.s 64 (1970).
'54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). See 31 U. CN. L. REv. 183 (x962); 14 STAN. L. Rzv. 95o (x962).
" Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969). According to another recent case, imposition of
a duty to treat an emergency does not necessarily mean that the patient must be admitted as an inpatient
so long as the treatment given alleviates the immediate crisis. See Joyner v. Alton Ochsner Medical
Foundation, 230 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
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the right of a plaintiff to sue a public hospital for failure to render care when the
plaintiff appeared with a broken arm, visibly in pain, and "in a state of traumatic
injury." 8 The court commented,
To say that a public institution which has assumed this duty [emergency care] and
held itself out as giving such aid can arbitrarily refuse to give emergency treatment
to a member of the public... is repugnant to our entire system of government.59
Similar humanitarian feelings underlie the statutory measures which impose a duty
upon both public and private hospitals which maintain emergency departments to
furnish emergency treatment to anyone who applies, regardless of ability to pay. 0
Yet rather than wait for gradual legislative efforts to cope with the unfortunate com-
mon law history, it is time for frank judicial recognition that the modern emergency
facility has a firm legal obligation to fulfill its purpose by rendering "emergency"
assistance to all.
B. Hospitals as Public Service Institutions
Provision of emergency care without regard to economic circumstances would
constitute a significant step toward assuring universal access to health services. Yet
full implementation of the goal would depend on guaranteed access to the full
range of care, in addition to emergency services, encompassed by modern medicine.
This would include preventive care, a spectrum of outpatient services, and in-
patient services. The prospects of judicially compelling the construction of the
necessary new facilities are bleak. But the courts might legitimately be asked to assure
access of poor persons to existing facilities, at least those facilities erected to care
for the general public or the sick poor. It is not out of the question to speak, for
example, of a common law obligation of hospitals-at least the governmental or
voluntary ones-to offer services without excluding the indigent.
The mass of legal history is admittedly contrary to the above proposition. Tradi-
tionally, a hospital has been under no obligation to extend its services to a patient
it did not desire to serve. Despite the critical social importance of their functions,
neither physicians nor hospitals have been customarily compelled to render free
care. 1 This rule has been especially rigid in jurisdictions which preserved the
notion of voluntary, nonprofit institutions as private entities.6" As succinctly stated
in one case, "Defendant is a private corporation, and not a public institution, and
owes the public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it. In this respect it is
8
'Williams v. Hospital Authority, 19 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (i969).
10 Id. at 627, 168 S.E.2d at 337.
00See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § II-297A (1956); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § z407.5 (West SuPP.
1969); ILL. ltv. STAT. ch. xII/z, §§ 86-87 (1967); N.Y. Ptu. HEALTH LAw § 2806 (McKinney Supp.
1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 2 (x964).
01 See J. RICHARDSON, DoctoRs, LAwmyxs, AND THE Cours IO (1965).
"'See, e.g., Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), afl'd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.
,964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965)-
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not similar to a public utility."63 Even utilities have generally not been required to
serve persons who were unable to pay for the service.
Yet hospitals were historically founded to meet the medical needs of the sick
poor.6 4 In accordance with the philanthropic motivations of their founders, the
charters of innumerable private "charitable" hospitals explicitly required the render-
ing of care to all patients who needed assistance, including the sick poor." Such
institutions were sustained by the charitable contributions of the public at large.
In many instances fiscal burdens have gradually impeded continuation of the hos-
pital's charitable function and in some instances provoked complete discontinuance
of "free" care. 6 But the original intent of establishing the voluntary hospital as a
haven for the sick poor is dear.
At the same time as the focus of hospital patient care was shifting from the poor
population toward the general public, the source of hospital funding was changing.
Massive infusions of public monies began, ending the reliance on private contributions
and eventually reaching the point where today approximately fifty per cent of
private hospitals' operating funds are derived from governmental sources.07 The
over-all impact of governmental contributions is even greater, including not just
Medicaid, Medicare, and local welfare funds but hospital construction loans, research
grants, and tax exemptions as well. Increased governmental input and growth of
the hospital as the focal point of health care for the general public have combined
to promote awareness of the social importance of the modern hospital. In part, this
awareness has been reflected by closer regulation and licensing of hospital facilities0
Another result has been general recognition of the modern hospital as a "social utility
...accountable to the community for the use it makes of the resources that the
community entrusts to it.''
To some extent, the public nature and function of the modern hospital has been
recognized in evolving legal doctrine. This judicial development has come primarily
in cases regulating the prerogatives of private hospitals and medical societies to
exclude or oust medical practitioners.70 The leading case is Griesman v. Newcomb
" Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 399, 157 So. 224, 225 (1934); see Scarce
Medical Resources, supra note 41, at 628-29.
04 See Knowles, supra note 49, at 13-15; M. HERSHEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN HossiTms IN ma PRIVATE
Saeros 217-19 (Industrial Relations Research Ass'n, 1969).
85 Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883, 885-86 (W.D. Mo. x963). See generally I. BELMKAP & J.
SrTINLE, THE CommcrNy AND ITs HosPITALs 9 (I963).
"0 See Note, working Rules for Assuring Nondiscrimination in Hospital Administration, 74 YALE LJ.
151, 156 n.32 (1964).
67 p1.L ComaassoN REPORT, supra note 4, at 59.
68See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 135B.I-.32 (Supp. 1970); ANN. LAWS MAss. ch. III § 71-72 (Supp.
1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-I (z964).
69 PiEr. CoNsanssioN REPORT, supra note 4, at 6o; see 57 KY. L.J. 297 (1969).
"' See, e.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soce'y, 34 N.J. 582, 17o A.2d 791 (1961); Pinsker
v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, a Cal. 3 d 16o, 460 P.2d 495, 8x Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Burkhart
v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.v.ad 433 (Ky. 1968); 57 Ky. LJ. 297 (1969).
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Hospital.71 There the plaintiff, a licensed physician, challenged the by-laws of de-
fendant hospital which barred his admission to the medical staff because he was a
graduate of an osteopathic rather than a medical school. The hospital defended on
the basis that as a private, nonprofit institution it had complete discretion-free of
judicial interference-to fix its requirements for staff membership. In a landmark
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the disputed by-law
as an arbitrary exclusion in violation of public policy and the hospital's fiduciary
obligations to the general public. The court found the hospital "private" in the
sense of being nongovernmental but "hardly private in other senses."'7' The hos-
pital's chartered dedication to the vital public use of serving the sick and injured
and the governmental contributions of funds and tax exemptions belied the notion
of a private entity. As "hospitals are operated not for private ends but for the
benefit of the public,"' 3 they receive their powers impressed with a public trust-
"fiduciary powers to be exercised reasonably and for the public good."'74 Precedent
for judicial intervention on a public trust theory was found in the traditional imposi-
tion of common law duties upon innkeepers, common carriers, and similar private
enterprises with extraordinary impact on the public75 In effect, the hospital was
treated by the court as a species of public utility; the context, of course, did not
involve a duty to serve without charge.
Another sensitive articulation of the "public trust" or "social utility" approach to
hospitals can be found in the lower court opinion in the Wilmington General Hos-
pital76 case, discussed above in connection with emergency care. At issue was a private
hospital's liability for failure to render emergency assistance to a patient who was
apparently able to pay for the service but had no physician's admission slip. The
lower court found a common law duty to render such care not because of patients'
reliance on the hospital's practice of providing emergency services but rather because
of the "quasi-public" nature of the institution. "The hospital meets a public need,
offers a public benefit, promotes the public welfare.""'T According to the court, these
public functions, in combination with tax exemptions and direct government appro-
priations for indigents' care, constituted "public aspects" which warranted imposition
of extraordinary obligations to benefit the community at large.
In short, the public trust concept of Griesman and Manlove provides a doctrinal
foundation for imposing a common law duty on nonproprietary hospitals to serve
the poor. Such a development would entail a radical departure from the historical
71 40 NJ. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
"Id. at 396, A.2d at 821.
"Id. at 403, 192 A.2d at 825.
"Id. at 402, 192 A.2d at 824.
"'See also Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 17o A.2d 791 (ig6i).
"Manlove v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18 (Super. Ct.), aff'd, 54 Del. 15, 174
A.2d 135 (r961).
7"Id. at 343, 169 A.2d at 21.
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permissive attitude toward hospitals' admissions policies. 8 Yet the development
would be no more innovative, in its theory, than evolution of the labor union's
duty of fair representation or the common law remedy for invasion of the right to
privacy. The hospital's obligation, like the union's duty, would be grounded solidly
on fundamental dictates of justice and public policy. Just as the courts could not
ignore the perilous status of the minority worker, they may not be able to tolerate
the spectre of human beings denied access to health care because of poverty. The
question remains whether, after examining the practical implications of the proposed
doctrine, wisdom would dictate that the courts establish a common law right of
access to health facilities.
To some extent the public trust formulation of hospital obligations actually avoids
some practical problems raised by the minimum-protection or right-to-life argument
discussed above. For example, there would be no need to judicially determine and
regulate minimum standards of care. Problems of enforcement would be dimin-
ished; right of access would be assured by injunctive relief against hospital admin-
istrators or by damage actions against hospitals for failure to honor their obligations.
Nor would a common law right of access, enforceable against hospitals, run into
the judicial hesitancy to compel a coordinate branch of government to allocate vast
resources to a health priority-a problem which would plague enforcement of the
right-to-life principle.
A common law right of access based on the public trust theory would, however,
impose a tremendous fiscal burden on nonproprietary hospitals. That this is so
does not automatically exclude consideration of the theory or mean that the burdens
are unreasonable. For present obligations imposed on hospitals have created fiscal
burdens that have generally been overcome without serious adverse consequences.
The common law duty to handle emergency cases79 impels the expenditure of funds
to service poor patients. Traditional regulatory controls placed upon hospitals also
require expenditures: code requirements with regard to fireproofing, building
specifications, equipment, and personnel may all impose heavy financial burdens in
order to protect the public interest; even the regulation of staff admissions and
ousters may provoke expenditures in setting up hearings on qualifications or mis-
conduct."' Yet fiscal integrity remains an important consideration in determining
whether a hospital should be compelled to service indigent patients. The economic
burden might be great enough to invoke complaints of an unconstitutional
"taking"; at the very least, the expense would have a substantial enough impact
on a hospital's ability to function to warrant careful consideration. These factors
assume even greater importance when it is considered that hospitals, unlike govern-
78 Of course, some inroads on hospital admissions policies have already been made with regard to pre-
duding racial discrimination. See, e.g., Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4 th Cir. 1964).7 9 See pp. 909-913 supra.
"
0 See Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (App. Div. 1967).
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mental bodies, do not possess the taxing power necessary to distribute "public in-
terest" burdens over the general population. Thus, unless third-party payments from
private insurers or government benefit programs covered all patients, a situation
which dearly does not exist, the fiscal burdens on private hospitals stemming from
indigents' care would be a very real factor to consider in shaping any emerging
common law obligation.
Many voluntary hospitals would doubtless contend that a duty to accept indigent
patients means bankruptcy. Indeed, such institutions already contend that in many
locales they are in dire fiscal straits.8l It might be argued that these "nonprofit"
hospitals are not really in danger of insolvency, and -that the effect of the proposed
common law obligation would simply be to realign their priorities toward basic
patient care. According to this theory, modern charitable hospitals divert resources
needed for patient care -toward mindless expansion, expensive and underutilized
equipment, research, and teaching.' It might also be argued that a common law
right of access would simply redirect nonprofit "charitable" institutions to fulfill their
original purposes.83 Given the essential public function which they would be per-
forming, it would then be inconceivable that "government" could allow the hos-
pitals to flounder. But there are several reasons why the threat to fiscal integrity
from a common law right of access cannot be ignored.
In the first place, even if reallocation of internal resources rather than insolvency
would be the product of the proposed common law obligation, courts must be hesitant
to mandate that result. There is no assurance that resources for patient care would
not be diverted from needed expansion or necessary research. Arguably, "[h]ospitals
should to a great extent be free to allocate their money according to a scheme which
they in good faith believe will produce the greatest good for the greatest number
of patients."84 Nor can it be automatically assumed that government would fully
subsidize the research and teaching potentially affected by added patient care obliga-
tions. Second, the added fiscal burden imposed by a common law right of access
would probably cripple, and not just hamper, some hospitals. An urban institution
which services a primarily poor population would not have the needed budgetary
flexibility to absorb the burden of indigents' care. Without a comprehensive system
of third-party payments-a system which Medicaid and Medicare do not yet provide
-insolvency would presumably result.
One "solution" would be to limit the common law "public service" obligation
to provision of an economically feasible volume of services. This formula, however,
obviously involves extensive problems of judicial administration, and courts must
8 1 See Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. X256 (E.D.N.Y.), 305 F. Supp. 1268
(E.D.N.Y. x969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 820 (1970).
"
2See Medical Empires, BULL. HEALTH PoLTcy Anvisoity CoUNCm, Nov.-Dec. x969; The Trouble with
Empires, BULL. HEaLTH PoLicy ADvisoRY Cotmcm, Apr. 1969.
8 Note, Working Rules for .4ssuring Nondiscrimination in Hospital Administration, 74 YALE L.J. i5i,
156 n.32 (1964).
"
4 Scarce Medical Resources, supra note 41, at 691.
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be ready to deal with the complex issues raised. The problems arise as soon
as the hospital can no longer admit patients strictly according to health needs.
Would economies then be accomplished by limiting the volume of patients admitted
or by restricting the type of services provided? When does hospital expansion
become appropriate? Could a hospital restrict usage of expensive equipment (such
as renal dialysis machines) to paying patients who would make the equipment self-
sustaining? Could availability of a fixed percentage of beds, say thirty per cent,
for indigent patients be required? What income level would constitute indigency
for purposes of the common law definition? Could a hospital satisfy its obligations
by adopting sliding fee schedules, or must services be absolutely free to persons
below a certain income level? Indeed, when is a medical facility sufficiently imbued
with public interest to trigger a public service obligation? Do neighborhood health
centers or group practices have the same essential characteristics as hospitals? These
various administrative problems and issues indicate that courts would have to
struggle to monitor a standard which varied the obligation of hospitals toward in-
digent patients according to the economic viability of particular institutions. Yet
imposition of a crippling financial burden might be both unwise and constitutionally
suspect8 5
A second "solution" would simply utilize most hospitals' immediate ability to
spread costs by increasing charges to nonindigent patients. The issue then becomes
whether the burden of providing for poor patients should be absorbed by the seg-
ment of the public which is unfortunate enough to undergo hospital care and which
is already paying exorbitant fees. Or should the burden be distributed over the
general population via tax mechanisms? If the bulk of hospital payments come
from government or other third-party payors, perhaps the costs immediately at-
tributable to paying hospital patients are ultimately absorbed by the general popula-
tion. Until that is dear, there are considerable hazards in imposing a common law
obligation upon hospitals to treat all members of the public. Yet the status quo-a
dual system of health care-is so distasteful that, despite the risks, it is well worth
the effort of an enterprising court to shape a legal obligation to care for indigent
patients. By clarifying the public nature of the modern hospital and indicating its
concomitant obligation to provide services according to health need rather than
wealth, the judiciary would merely redirect the hospital toward its intended function




In the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946,s8 popularly known as the
" Cf. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (x95x).
80 Ch. 958, 6o Stat. 1040.
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Hill-Burton act, Congress established a program to provide funds for local hospital
construction and modernization which has prevailed to the present day. The pro-
gram is administered by the Health Services and Mental Health Administration
of HEW, which allocates funds to states which have submitted satisfactory "plans"
conforming to federal regulations. Of primary interest here are certain provisions
of the act and regulations which relate to services for persons unable to pay therefor,
for it has been argued that these provisions provide a legal basis for compelling
facilities constructed with Hill-Burton money to care for indigent patients."7
The basis for the argument is subsection 291c(e) of the act, which authorizes
regulations which would require grant applicants to assure that
there will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or
modernized a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor, but
an exception shall be made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial
viewpoint. 88
The implementing regulations read in pertinent part as follows:
The facility will furnish below cost or without charge a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay therefor. As used in this paragraph, "persons
unable to pay therefor" includes persons who are otherwise self-supporting but
are unable to pay the full cost of needed services. Such services may be paid for
wholly or partly out of public funds or contributions of individuals and private
and charitable organizations such as community chest or may be contributed at the
expense of the facility itself. In determining what constitutes a reasonable volume
of services to persons unable to pay therefor, there shall be considered conditions
in the area to be served by the applicant, including the amount of such services
that may be available otherwise than through the applicant. The requirements of
assurance from the applicant may be waived if the applicant demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the State agency, subject to subsequent approval by the Secretary,
that to furnish such services is not feasible financially .. .
Although it appears that very few facilities have opted out of the obligation by
demonstrating financial weakness, it also appears that "no mechanism has been
established within HEW to enforce the commitment, nor has HEW ever acted in
this regard. 9
0
As currently worded, the regulations contain too many loopholes to serve as an
effective vehicle for assuring indigents' access to private hospitals. In the first
" For comprehensive and interesting discussions of Hill-Burton's relevance to poor populations, see two
recent articles by Marilyn G. Rose, Deputy Director of the National Legal Program on Health Problems
of the Poor: Hospital Admission of the Poor and the Hill-Burton Act, 3 CLEARIUNGHOUSE Rv. 185 (i969);
The Duty of Publicly Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 254 (1970).
as 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (x964).
so 42 C.F.R. § 53.iiI(b) (1970).
'
0 Hospital Admission of the Poor and the Hill-Burton Act, supra note 87, at 192.
" One writer has suggested that the present regulations, in their permissiveness toward hospitals'
means of satisfying the obligation to provide "free" care, are inconsistent with the act. See The Duty of
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
place, services may be furnished either below cost or without charge. Any facility
currently accepting Medicaid patients will contend, and probably legitimately so,
that Medicaid reimbursement does not meet full hospital costs; these patients
are therefore already being serviced "below cost." Second, the regulations explicitly
state that the required services may be paid for out of public funds or may be
contributed at the expense of the facility itself. Thus, hospitals receiving local
welfare patients, or even Medicaid patients, are arguably fulfilling their obligations.
Finally, there is the omnipresent opportunity for a facility to evade entirely a com-
mitment to indigents by demonstrating financial inability to meet* the burden.
The act itself indicates in two different places that the financial integrity of institu-
tions is not to be jeopardized by obligations to service the poor. 2 At the very least,
the exercise of this option by a hospital will place a substantial burden on litigators
to pierce the bookkeeping veil surrounding hospital finances and show that services
to indigents are feasible. Even then, a "reasonable volume" must be defined. Just
as would be the case in administering a common law obligation to service indigents,
there would be complex problems in assessing the hospital's ability to direct funds
to the service of indigent patients. The one advantage under Hill-Burton is that there
are administrative agencies-both HEW and the state administering agency-which
are presumably equipped to appraise accurately the economic position of particular
facilities.
B. Medicaid
Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965,"3 commonly known as Medicaid,
was intended "to make medical services for the needy more generally available."'94
By guaranteeing reimbursement to providers for furnishing care to indigents, it
Publicly Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, supra note 87, at 256. This
argument is centered on the notion that "persons unable to pay therefor" must include medically
indigent persons unable to meet any costs of care as well as persons able to meet partial costs either
through Medicaid or personal resources, as well as on the idea that the free care provision was supposedly
a central provision of the act. Id. at 261.
However, it is doubtful that Hill-Burton was intended to be of great importance to poverty com-
munities. There was frank recognition throughout the legislative hearings that the bill's failure to provide
for hospital operating and maintenance costs severely restricted its utility to poverty areas. See S. REP.
No. 674, 79th Cong., ist Sess. 6, 17-20, 190 (1945). The free care sections might have been added on the
assumption, then, that applicants would be from relatively affluent areas which could shoulder the added
expenses. At the same time, Congress added two specific indications of concern for the continuing
financial integrity of recipient institutions. See 42 U.S.C. § 29xc(e) (x964), 291e(f) (1946). Thus, if
hospitals are in fact economically pressed in just meeting the differential between Medicaid reimburse-
ments and actual costs, there is probably little hope of securing more "free" care under the act. However,
the part of the regulations which permits private hospitals to meet their obligation through "public
funds" is certainly suspect. The provision would be reasonable if applied strictly to governmental hos-
pitals, where part of the Medicaid funds actually come from the same governmental source as operates
in the hospital; but private hospitals should not be absolved of their obligation by payments from local
governmental sources.
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c(e) (1964), 291e(f) (1946).
:'Pub. Law 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343.9
'S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., xst Sess. 74 (z965).
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was thought that poor patients would obtain access to any facility and receive
care previously denied. "The notion was that Medicaid would liberate the poor
from bondage to a particular doctor . . . or charity hospital either owned by the
state or having a charity contract with the state."" A section of the act known as
the "freedom of choice" provision"° assured recipients that services could be obtained
at the facility of their choice, provided that the facility was willing to render services
to Medicaid recipients.
To some extent Medicaid has in fact resulted in increased usage of health services
by the poor. Particularly for specialty services such as dental care, people who had
previously gone unattended sought and obtained medical assistance pursuant to
Medicaid.17 But the increase in utilization has come primarily in numbers of
patients, and not in any improvement or change in the quality of care or type of
facility rendering services. "The poor remain in the same system as before-receiving
charity medicine and stigmatized as such by receiving care from providers catering
exclusively or substantially to those unable to afford mainstream medical care." '
Many fewer doctors than anticipated have agreed to take Medicaid patients and to
subscribe to the provider terms set down by the Medicaid program. 9 In New York
City, for example, it has been estimated that only fifteen per cent of eligible prac-
titioners have enrolled as Medicaid providers. Nor has the program caused a sig-
nificant shift in location of providers; the ghettoes still suffer from a dearth of
private physicians.
Various explanations have been advanced for Medicaid's failure to attract a
sufficient number of physicians. Unrealistic fee schedules, delays in payment, and
excessive paperwork or red tape have all been cited as explanatory factors.100 But
whatever the actual cause, it is clear that the failure to enlist sufficient practitioners
violates both the letter and the spirit of the Medicaid statute and regulations. Cer-
tainly, freedom of choice'01 can never be a reality until an adequate number of
Medicaid providers are available. Further, the regulations specifically require that
fee structures be "realistic" and designed to enlist sufficient practitioners for the
program; 0 2 at least two-thirds of the practitioners in the state should be enrolled' 03
Moreover, the state administering agency is responsible for assuring that the program
is uniformly and continuously operating throughout the state 04 The overriding
'0 Edelstein, Medicaid, in MTruA.s oN HA.xM .. r s PREmA. Fop. THE NATIONAL CONF.'mNCE.
ON HAsH rGHTS OF T PooR 93 (National Institute for Education in Law and Poverty, 1970).
Do 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. IV, 1969).
17 See Medicaid: The Patchwork Crazy Quilt, 5 COLum. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 62, 66 n.37 (x969).
, Edelstein, supra note 95.
' See Medicaid: The Patchwork Crazy Quilt, supra note 97, at 76-77.
"' Id. at 77-79.
10142 U.S.C. § I396a(a)(23) (Supp. IV, 1969).
"" HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION § 5320.1 (Supp. D I966). See also id. §§ 5144,
5340, 5360, regarding fee structures.
o"Id. § 5330.3.
'Id. §§ 2230(2), (5), (6), 2280.
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objective, according to the regulations, is to secure care for poor persons to the extent
available to the general population.1 °5
The problem, then, is not in finding legal bases for arguing that the Medicaid
program is failing to fulfill its obligations but rather in finding remedial channels
and in shaping specific relief. The two principal defects appear to be "unrealistic"
fee schedules and administrative delays in processing bills. As to the former prob-
lem, it is simply not palatable for Medicaid patients to try and raise physicians'
incomes without also provoking over-all changes in the health care delivery system; 0
Medicaid has already contributed markedly to an inflationary spiral of medical costs.
And providers have demonstrated their own capacity to lobby for increased re-
imbursements' 07 The second objective-improvement of administrative efficiency-
is a desirable goal and one which might be expanded to cover other aspects of
Medicaid which affect poor persons 08 But ending delays and inefficiencies is not
an easily attainable objective, either through judicial or administrative channels.
Experience with welfare administration has indicated that bureaucratic intransigency
is not subject to easy rectification.10 Thus, a state agency may be ordered to process
applications or bills within a defined period, but there is no effective sanction for
nonconformity with the order other than the unrealistic option of cutting off federal
contributions to the state program. Similarly, a state may be ordered to enroll at
least two-thirds of its practitioners as Medicaid providers, but there is no apparent
way of assuring that the desired result will be accomplished.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate objective is adequate health care readily available for all citizens. The
preceding analysis indicates that litigation has a role to play if the courts will be
innovative in shaping new rights for impoverished citizens and new remedies to meet
the extraordinary challenge of providing expensive facilities and manpower. Recent
Supreme Court decisions do not furnish much basis for optimism. Reliance will have
to be placed on the ability of both the Constitution and the common law to challenge
social injustice in whatever limited ways legal remedies are suitable to solving massive
economic and political problems. A genuine shift in governmental priorities is likely
to come only through political channels.
%05 Id. § 5340.
106 Cf. REPorcr op TE TAsrT FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RELATED PRootms 36-39 (1970).
11T See Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y.), 305 F. Supp. 1268
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 820 (1970).
... For example, litigators might seek to streamline the procedures for processing applications and
handling administrative appeals.
10' See generally Murphy & Wexler, Alternatives to King v. Smith in Enforcing State Compliance tvith
the Social Security Act, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 61 (1969).
